Tasks accomplished during poll-closing

The most important poll-closing task—counting our votes—is now usually done by computer, but several critical tasks still need to be done by humans. The tasks serve three main functions:

1)      Make sure all valid votes have been counted (write-ins, absentee);

2)      Detect any obvious signs of error or fraud (mostly, matching the number of ballots cast to the number of voters); and

3)      Create and preserve a true, secure record of the election (reporting the vote totals, creating the inspector’s report, sealing the ballots and other election records).

Purposes of observing

The mere presence of observers—even if they say nothing—helps to ensure the audits are performed thoroughly and in accordance with instructions. Observers serve as extra eyes to help protect against mistakes or deliberate wrongdoing, and If any problems arise.

When everything goes well, observers can provide municipal clerks with independent verification of the election procedures’ integrity, if it is questioned after the election. When problems arise, citizen observers can help to ensure that the problems are adequately noted and resolved.

The basics of observing

Election officials are understandably cautious about the conduct of observers before the results have been documented and the ballots safely sealed, so knowing and following some basic rules is very important.

Every polling place has one person designated as the “Chief Inspector.” Follow his or her instructions and you will do fine. Even if the Chief Inspector is doing something wrong, remember that he or she has the authority to throw you out if you become disruptive (regardless of the reason for your disruption) , so follow the Chief Inspector’s orders and document the incident so you can report it later to higher election officials and possibly law enforcement.

People can observe in any precinct they want, but WGN encourages observers to observe their home precincts where they vote, for several reasons. Election officials are more receptive and cooperative with their own constituents; local residents are more likely to be familiar with the procedures and the people in their home precinct; and in the event that issues arise, local residents have more authority and ability to work with the election officials to follow through and make sure the problems are resolved.

How to Observe: Before Election Day

1)  Familiarize yourself with the basic rules and guidelines for observers.

Anyone—including candidates—has the right to observe poll-closing activities. Every polling place must provide an area where observers can “hear and readily observe” all public aspects of the process, without disrupting the activities.

Be sure to read GAB instructions for observers, noting that different restrictions apply to observers before and after polls close. These simple, common-sense rules have the force of law. 

 Please also review general instructions for observers, part 1 of this series.

2)  Acquaint yourself with the basic tasks of poll-closing.

Look through pages 84-122 of the Election Day Manual for Clerks, though you need not read the whole document. The activities you will be observing are the ones described on those pages, though not all of these instructions will need to be performed in every election.

You will want to refer to the Election Day Manual as you observe. A copy of this manual should be at the polling place for reference. However, in case it is not, or in case the polling place has only an out-of-date copy, consider downloading a copy of the manual from the GAB website onto a laptop or notebook computer you can take with you.

3)  Contact your municipal clerk.

You are within your rights to show up unannounced. However, letting the municipal clerk ahead of time that you will be observing has several advantages. The clerk will be able to alert the poll workers to expect observers and might have some useful information for you.

Try to contact the clerk about a month before the election. The closer it gets to Election Day, the more stressed and busy the clerk will be.

You may want to confirm with the clerk that copies of the Election-Day Manual will be available for observers’ reference at each polling place.

4)  Collect the things you will need to take with you.

• These instructions;
• a pen and notebook;
• a cell phone and the numbers for municipal clerk’s office and the county clerk’s office,
• a photo ID (a requirement, though often not requested);
• a laptop or notebook computer with a downloaded copy of the current Election Day Manual; and
• a camera in case you see something that you need to document.

How to Observe: On Election Day before 8 PM

Arrive at the polling place early enough to introduce yourself to the Chief Inspector and to vote.

In each polling place, one person has been designated as the “Chief Inspector.” You can ask any poll worker to identify the Chief Inspector. Other than that, the Chief Inspector is the only poll worker you should talk to in your role as observer, unless he or she allows otherwise.

Introduce yourself to the Chief Inspector while you are there to vote, unless he or she is busy with some emergency. Let him or her know you plan to observe poll-closing activities later that night. The Chief Inspector will tell you how to sign in as an observer.

Vote after you’ve introduced yourself as a poll-closing observer to the Chief Inspector. This is a solid way to make him or her aware that you are a local constituent.

Set your cell phone on vibrate.

Take a moment to prepare your attitude, so that you’re ready to maintain patience and good will all evening. It might get late, people might get irritable, and some might even be suspicious and hostile toward you. Remember that compassion goes a long way in keeping both you and others cooperative.

If you feel that you are being inappropriately denied access to observing any part of the election process, call the municipal clerk or county clerk’s office.

Observe the processing of absentee ballots, if it is underway. Instructions are below.

How to Observe: On Election Day after 8 PM

Continue to speak only with the Chief Inspector (not any of the other elections officials), unless the Chief Inspector allows you to do otherwise.

Ask the Chief Inspector if you can see any local instructions for printing out the poll tapes and shutting down the voting machines. These instructions are not in GAB materials, because they vary by type of machine.

Do not touch any original election materials (machines, ballots, poll books, etc.) If you want to examine a document, such as the poll tape, ask to have it shown to you or left on a table where you can read it without touching it. If you want to see the back of a document, or a different section of a machine printout, ask an the Chief Inspector or his/her designee to turn the page or move the tape.

Note: The steps described below might not be followed in precisely the order in which they are described here.

How to Observe: Processing absentee ballots

The basics of this process are:

• Each envelope must be checked to see that it is properly signed and has the required information.
• Each name must be checked against the list of registered voters (the poll book) to make sure the voter is registered in this precinct, and to mark the poll book to show that the person voted;
• The envelopes accepted must be opened and separated from the ballots; and
• The votes on the absentee ballots must be counted.

Some steps may have been completed during the day, before poll closing.

What should observers watch for?

Expect the clerks to follow the instructions on pages 87-97 of the Election Day Manual, including:

• The absentee ballots should have been delivered to the precinct in a sealed bag or container that was opened where the public could observe.
• The absentee ballot envelopes should be examined and opened where the public can observe.
• The officials should review the information on each envelope and accept only ballots with correct information and reject only ballots without correct information.
• Voters submitting absentee ballots should be marked on the poll book.

Some situations might arise that require officials to make copies of some absentee ballots. See page 94 in the Election Day Manual for detailed instructions about re-making ballots.

How to observe:  Hand counting votes

Some Wisconsin communities still count votes by hand. Expect the officials to follow the directions on pages 97-101 of the Election Day Manual.

What should observers watch for?

• Election officials should be fair and reasonable when deciding which ballots to reject as defective.
• Four election officials should participate in counting the votes on each ballot, and all should remain continuously attentive and deliberate, never allowing just one person to determine the votes.
• If any ballots or votes are defective, the election officials should note the reasons on the Inspectors’ Report.

How to observe: Processing paper ballots and counting write-in votes (op-scan)

The basics of this process are:

• All the ballots must be removed from the voting machine bins
• All the ballots need to be checked to find and count the write-ins.
• Votes from any ballots that the machine couldn’t read need to counted.

What should observers watch for?

Expect the clerks to follow the instructions on pages 101-102 and 104-122 of the Election Day Manual.

• The officials should maintain careful, tight control of the ballots at all times, not letting them get scattered around the room, never leaving them unattended, and not letting stacks get mixed up.

How to observe: Printing out and reporting results (op-scan)

The basics of this process are:

• The voting machine output is printed out;
• The officials verify that there are no signs the machine’s memory has been tampered with during the day;
• (Local option) Results are electronically transmitted to the county clerk’s office; and
• The ballots and the voting machine’s electronic memory are sealed.

What should observers watch for?

Expect the clerks to follow the instructions on pages 102-103 of the Election Day Manual, and any other local instructions for shutting down the voting machines and transmitting results. Ask the Chief Inspector to see any additional written instructions provided by the county or municipal clerk.

Note: GAB provides only minimal instructions for this process, so local officials may be unaware of some basic IT-security practices. Two of these are:

• The tape showing the precinct results should be printed before the machine is plugged into any communications outlet. This is an important safeguard against electronic manipulation of the results. If the voting machine is plugged into any sort of telecommunications system before the results tape is printed, ask that this be noted on the Inspector’s Report.
• The results should be examined for surprising levels of ‘undervoting’—that is, a curiously large number of voters not expressing any preference for any of the most important races on the ballot. For example, fewer than 2-3 percent of the voters skip the Presidential race when that is on the ballot. Higher rates of undervoting indicate the possibility of voting-machine malfunction, and so should be noted on the Inspector’s Report.

How to observe: Printing out and reporting results (touch-screen)

The basics of this process are:

• The results are printed out of the voting machine;
• The officials verify that there are no signs the machine’s memory has been tampered with during the day;
• (Local option) Results are electronically transmitted to the county clerk’s office; and
• The voter-verifiable paper trail and the voting machine’s electronic memory are sealed.

What should observers watch for?

Expect the clerks to follow the instructions on page 103 of the Election Day Manual, and any other local instructions for shutting down the voting machines and transmitting results. Ask the Chief Inspector to see any additional written instructions provided by the county or municipal clerk.

Note: GAB provides only minimal instructions for this process, so local officials may be unaware of some basic IT-security practices. Two of these are:

• The tape showing the precinct results should be printed before the machine is plugged into any communications outlet. This is an important safeguard against electronic manipulation of the results. If the voting machine is plugged into any sort of telecommunications system before the results tape is printed, ask that this be noted on the Inspector’s Report.
• The records of each ballot on the voter-verifiable paper trail (VVPAT) are considered the official ballots. The VVPAT should be briefly inspected to ensure it printed correctly and legibly, and did not jam or otherwise fail to record the votes. If officials notice any problems with the VVPAT, these problems should be noted on the Inspector’s Report.

How to observe: Reconciling the poll book and the poll tape

During the day, election officials kept track of which registered voters cast ballots by marking voters’ names off on two copies of the official list of registered voters, the “poll book.” One copy will go to the county clerk; the other will stay with the municipality. Both need to include the same information. In addition, the number of voters recorded as having voted should match the number of ballots counted.

The officials will review the voters’ names and any notations made to ensure the two books contain identical information. They will also compare the number of voters recorded as having voted to the number of ballots counted, to make sure that the two numbers are equal.

What should observers watch for?

Expect the officials to follow the instructions on page 113-114 of the Election Day Manual.

How to observe: Sealing the election records.

After they have finished their work with ballots (counting absentee votes, looking for write-ins on paper ballots, etc.), the officials need to seal the marked ballots or the VVPAT in containers or bags that are sealed with numbered seals so that the containers or bags cannot be opened in any way without leaving evidence of the opening. The seal numbers will be recorded on the Inspector’s Statement.

The ballots represent the legal, public record of the votes and should be protected very carefully. If every ballot is not protected and carefully accounted for, it will be impossible to audit or recount the results.

What should observers watch for?

Expect the officials to follow instructions on pages 117-118 of the Election Day Manual. Among the things you can watch for:

• Officials should maintain careful control of all ballots—marked and unmarked—at all times, never leaving them unattended or getting them mixed up.
• Officials should be vigilant in recording the unique security-seal numbers of each container or bag accurately on the appropriate reports.
• Officials should not seal vote tally sheets, machine output tapes showing vote totals, or the Inspectors’ statement in the ballot container or bag.
• Officials should treat unused ballots with as much care as marked ballots, carefully collecting them and wrapping or binding them separately from the marked ballots, and making sure none are left behind. Although GAB does not require unused ballots to be returned in sealed bags, they can be.

What to do if you see problems

If you see any practices that don’t match the instructions or that seem inconsistent with the purpose of the poll-closing tasks, ask the Chief Inspector to explain. There may be some necessary, harmless variations for sensible reasons. As long as the main purpose is fulfilled—counting all valid votes; documenting any indications of possible miscounts; and creating a clear, secure, accurate and complete record of the votes—there’s no need for observers to be sticklers.

If the clerk cannot give you a good explanation for the variation, and you think the noncompliant practice creates a serious problem, refer the clerk to the precise requirement or instruction that you believe is not being followed. Explain the reason for your concern.

Document the problem as well as you can. You are allowed to take photographs of the documents in question, except the poll book. However, because you are not allowed to handle the documents you will need to have an official place the document so that you can photograph it.

If you cannot work out a mutually satisfactory resolution with the Chief Inspector, encourage him or her to contact the municipal clerk about the matter, and say you will do the same.

If at all possible, discuss the matter with the municipal clerk before the poll-closing activities are completed, with consistent reference to specific written requirements, and an openness to a reasonable explanation for the variation.

If you cannot resolve the issue with the municipal clerk, let the matter go for the evening. As soon as possible—the next day, preferably-- write an account of the problem that concerned you, including all relevant details clearly, factually, and completely. Provide your account to the municipal clerk and to the county clerk, and tell the county clerk you would like the problem discussed and resolved by the county board of canvass. This meeting is open to the public; ask the county clerk when it will be meeting.

Depending on the severity of the problem, contact the Elections Division of the Wisconsin Government Accountability Board, the day after the elction if at all possible. GAB can be reached by phone at (608) 266-8005, or email at gab@wi.gov. Consider completing a complaint form (gab.wi.gov/forms/complaint ), and faxing it to GAB at (608) 267-0500.

Please also consider sending an account of the problem to the Wisconsin Grassroots Network at wisconsingrassroots@gmail.com. We may be able to offer guidance in resolving the matter, and we will be compiling data on the problems noted by observers to improve understanding of election integrity issues in Wisconsin.

Purpose of the post-election voting-machine audit

Federal law requires states to audit their voting machines after at least some elections to see whether they count votes accurately. The state law governing our post-election audits, s.7.08(6), Wis. Stats, fulfills only the bare minimum for the federal mandate and has several other flaws that prevent these audits from conclusively verifying election results. Nevertheless, if the audits are done well, they can provide local officials and citizens with useful information and might detect any serious miscounts.

UPDATE (and GOOD NEWS!): At its October 28, 2014 meeting, and at the urging of WGN's Election Integrity Action Team, Wisconsin's Government Accountability Board corrected one of the biggest flaws in our post-election audit process. They voted to amend their previous instructions that clerks wait until after all deadlines for recounts had passed before they could begin the audits, and replaced it with instructions that local election officials could begin post-election audits AT ANY TIME.

Thanks to GAB Board member Hon. Elsa Lamelas, who made the motion to amend the instructions; Hon. Harold Froehlich, who seconded it, and Hon. Thomas Barland and Hon. John Franke, who supported it. (Hon. Gerald Nichol was absent from the meeting.) Only one judge voted against the change, and all their questions and remarks evidenced serious and sincere concern for accurate election results.

These observers' instructions have been revised to reflect the clerks' new freedom to verify their voting-machine output whenever they see fit.

The audits also have an important quality-assurance purpose. Hectic activity on Election Day leaves little time to calmly assess what is being done well or sloppily. Post-election audits provide opportunity for election officials to review the quality of some election practices.

Why observe the audits?

Without observers, transparency cannot be achieved. Election officials cannot demonstrate anything to the public if the public isn’t present.

Even if observers say nothing, their presence helps to ensure officials perform the tasks thoroughly and in accordance with instructions, and to ensure that any problems discovered in the audit are not dismissed or ignored.

Observing hand counts (at least those not part of a contentious, hurried recount) can be a moving experience. People have fought and died for the right to count votes; to be present as our neighbors carry on this sacred heritage is an honor. 

Finally, because voting-machine audits are often relatively relaxed, unhurried occasions, they provide opportunity for the municipal clerk and interested citizens to develop mutual respect for their shared interest in accurate election results.

When are voting machine results audited?

If your municipal clerk does no more than the law minimally requires, your election results will rarely be checked for accuracy, if ever.  You and your fellow citizens can request that your municipal clerk conduct audits on his or her own initiative, but if he or she declines, you will need to wait until GAB orders an audit.

After the November elections in even-numbered years, the state Governmental Accountability Board (GAB) randomly selects a very small number of precincts in which the voting machines will be audited—likely only 100 of the more than 3,500 Wisconsin precincts.

GAB orders those municipalities to perform a hand count of the votes in each selected precinct and to compare the hand-count results against the machine-tabulated results in four races identified by GAB to make sure the machines counted correctly. In some counties, the county clerk’s office performs the audits for the municipalities.

The timing of these audits limits their value. GAB instructs municipalities to wait to verify the results’ accuracy until after GAB has certified all statewide election results as final, which is likely in mid- to late November. (You read that correctly: Many states don’t allow unaudited results to be certified as final. Ours recommends it!) The audits can occur anytime after the voting machine output is printed out, before or after the ballot bags have been sealed. Your clerk may not be aware of this change in GAB policy; it was made on October 28, 2014. 

What happens at an audit?

Post-election audits are usually calm; the action will be deliberate and careful. Because these audits are so rare, small municipalities may never have conducted one. Even in larger municipalities, it’s likely only one or two people will have audit experience. Expect the officials in charge and the auditors to pay close attention to the written instructions, even reading them aloud at times.

There are no requirements regarding who the clerk might call upon to count the votes; they usually select employees from their office or experienced poll workers.

On the morning of the audit, sealed bags containing ballots and election records will be brought to the audit site and opened. Conscientious clerks will inspect the material for any signs of tampering and will review the chain of custody.

The auditors will be provided with tally sheets, pencils or pens, and perhaps calculators and white-out. They begin by counting the ballots into stacks of 20, and the stacks of 20 ballots are arranged in batches of 100.

The auditors will pair up, and each pair will take two batches of 100 ballots. Each auditor will then count the votes from one batch and trade batches with his/her partner. When both have counted both batches, they will compare their tally sheets. If their totals match, the two batches will be set aside, and they will move on to the next two batches.

If the two auditors’ totals for any batch do not agree, they will jointly review the ballots and try to find the ones that they counted differently. Experienced auditors will flag those ballots in some way, so that they can be located again in the final reconciliation process. When the two auditors agree on the vote totals in each batch, one will change his or her tally sheet, and they will move on to the next.

When all the ballots in the precinct have been hand-counted, the subtotals from all the tally sheets will be added together and compared against the totals on the voting-machine tape that was printed out on Election Night.

If the hand-counted totals in each race agree with the machine-tabulated totals, the audit is done, and the official in charge completes a report for GAB.

If any totals disagree, the auditors need to try to figure out why. They will need to check their addition, and then most likely, will engage in something of a guessing game trying to figure out how the voting machine might have read ambiguously marked ballots when auditing an optical-scan machine, or questioning their own counts.

When the auditors have decided how to explain any discrepancies, the audit is complete and the official in charge completes a report for the GAB.

How to find out whether and when an audit will take place

A day or two after a November election, call your municipal clerk or the GAB (608-266-8005) to find out whether any precincts in your county or municipality were selected for a post-election audit.  (GAB orders no audits after any but November elections.)

If you decide to observe, contact the municipal clerk to ask about his or her plans for scheduling, but be prepared to cut the clerk some slack: GAB doesn’t make it easy to schedule these audits.

GAB tells the clerks to conduct the audits only after GAB certifies the statewide results, but can say only that certification will happen sometime in mid- to late November. On that day, GAB will notify the clerks the audits can go forward, but the clerks must give the public 48 hours’ notice and complete the audits within two weeks.

Most clerks will try to follow GAB scheduling instructions, but because statutes do not require clerks to wait, a few will schedule the audit promptly. If the clerk intends to follow GAB recommendation, ask the clerk about the best way for you to get timely notification when the audit is finally scheduled.

You are allowed to show up unannounced, but if you let the clerk know ahead of time that you will be observing the post-election audit, he or she will be able to make sure there is room for you, and will be able to let the auditors know to expect observers so they won’t be surprised and nervous to see you.

How to observe a voting-machine audit

1.  Read these instructions before arriving, and follow the general instructions for observers, which are described in a separate document, also available from the WGN Election Integrity website.

2.  Bring a copy of the GAB audit instructions with you. The instructions at that link are from 2012; current instructions will probably be posted on the GAB website shortly after Election Day. New instructions may be available at that time by following links from this page. If you cannot locate current instructions, call GAB at 608-266-8005 to ask where they might be located.

3.  Arrive a little early to allow time for cordial introductions. Explain to the official in charge that the point of observing is to verify that the votes are being counted correctly, so you would like to be able at least part of the time to look over the auditors’ shoulders in a way that will not disrupt their work. At a minimum, you will need to see any ballots that the auditors discuss. The clerk should be able to accommodate these requests, as they do during recounts.

Auditing a single precinct can take all day, depending on the number of people counting votes, so you may want to plan to be there only at the beginning and at the time they reconcile the completed hand count with the machine tape. They will be unable to predict exactly when they will finish the hand count, but you might be able to estimate that after watching them count the first few batches.

4.  Although the clerks’ instructions do not specify this, the audit should begin with an inspection of the election records, including the ballot bags, to make sure all necessary records are on hand and are in order, much as the clerk would do for a recount.  The marked ballots or audit paper trail should still be sealed in bags or containers in such a way that no ballots can be inserted or removed without breaking the seal, and that show no signs of tampering; the inspector’s statement should be on hand and in order, containing the seal numbers that match those on the ballot bags, among other information; and the machine-printed results tape should be on hand.

If it appears that the machine tape or the sealed ballot bags have been tampered with before they are opened for the audit (unless there was a recount), please follow the instructions for when you see a problem, below.

5.  As the audit tasks proceed, ask questions throughout, as long as your questions don’t interfere with the purpose of the audit or slow it down more than the officials are willing to accommodate.

6.  Issues you should know about (Touch-screen audits)

Unusable voter-verifiable paper audit trail - Wisconsin law wisely requires touch-screen machines to create a voter-verifiable paper audit trail (VVPAT) –a paper print-out of each ballot cast by each voter. Although each voter has an opportunity to view this print-out and to cancel and re-cast it if necessary, research has shown that few voters ever look before they leave the voting booth. If the tape is malfunctioning---failing to advance, failing to print legibly, etc.— many voters can cast their ballots before any one notices and reports the problem to election officials.

If the audit finds that the paper trail cannot be read, the audit is impossible, because there is no record to audit. Follow the instructions for what to do if you see a problem, below.

Cancelled votes - Experts on election fraud have determined that, if a malicious programmer does manage to manipulate a touch-screen voting machine, the fraud could leave evidence in the form of an unreadable paper trail (see above) or a larger-than-expected number of cancelled ballots.

GAB’s instructions for post-election audits do not require clerks to be alert for such evidence, but as an observer, you can be. Because no one in Wisconsin looks for this, it’s hard to say how many cancelled-and-recast votes can be expected due to predictable human error or voters changing their minds at the last minute.  We recommend that if you see more than two cancelled ballots out of every thousand, you ask the auditors to examine two things more closely.

First, ask them to note to confirm that the number of valid ballots cast (not counting the cancelled ballots), equals the number of voters recorded in the poll books as having voted.  If the number of valid ballots cast is less than the number of voters, the cancelled ballots indicate a voter entered the voting booth, cancelled the vote entirely, and left without voting at all—something that should be extremely rare.  If the audit discovers that this occurred in more than two votes out of every thousand, please follow the instructions for reporting a problem, below.

Second, if the number of votes cast equals the number of voters recorded in the poll book, ask them to note whether all the re-cast votes were for the same candidate. (They can tell which votes were changed by comparing the cancelled ballot to the ballot immediately following it on the tape.) A pattern in which all the cancelled-and-changed votes were for the same candidate is consistent with a non-random malfunction.

Follow the instructions for reporting a problem, below, if the total number of cancelled-and-switched changed votes is more than two out of every 1,000 (0.02%), and the changes favored the same candidate. Suggest that the municipal clerk review the inspector’s report for that precinct to see whether it noted any voter reports of errors on the paper trail on Election Day.

7.  Issues you should know about  (Voter-marked paper ballots)

Ambiguously marked ballots   A certain proportion of votes can be expected to be ambiguously or sloppily marked, so that the hand-counters will disagree on the voter’s intent. 

This is not as serious an issue in audits as it is in recounts, where a few votes could change the outcome. Nevertheless, watch to see about how often the auditors disagree, and how they resolve their differences. Ask to see the ballots that seem to them to be ambiguously marked, so that you can develop your own sense of how well the voters marked their ballots. A very large proportion of ambiguously marked ballots—more than an average of one in every 100 ballots—may indicate a problem you could discuss with your municipal or county clerk: Could the ballots be better designed next election, could the voters be instructed more effectively?

Machine-unreadable votes   A subset of oddly marked ballots are marked in such a way that humans can easily discern the voter’s intent but a machine cannot.  For example, a voter may circle a candidate’s name on the ballot rather than filling in the target dot beside the candidate’s name, make a very faint mark, or use the wrong kind of ink.

A large number of these ballots—more than one in every 200 votes, according to some experts—could indicate a serious problem, which the auditors may or may not notice depending upon how closely they follow the GAB’s instructions.

Curiously, GAB has in previous years instructed the auditors to “count the votes as the machine would have counted them,” an instruction that could defeat the purpose of the audit if followed too literally. For example, if one voting station had been equipped with a colored pen that the optical scanner cannot read, every ballot completed with that pen would not have been counted on Election Day, although the voters’ intent would be clear to human eyes. If the auditors follow GAB’s instruction to “count the votes as the machine would have counted them,” they too would ignore the votes and mistakenly conclude the machine-tabulated results were correct.

Fortunately, common sense leads most auditors to count those votes, so that the issue becomes apparent only when the hand-counted results are compared to the machine-counted results.

If the auditors you observe seem to be altering the hand-count results in favor of their guess at how the machine counted in more than one vote out of every 200, follow the instructions below for what to do if you see a problem.

8.  When the hand-count is complete, the results are compared to the machine-tabulated results. If the two totals match, the machine tabulations are confirmed accurate and the audit is done. The clerk will complete a report to GAB indicating an ‘error rate’ of zero.

If the two totals do not agree, the clerk will need to figure out why they differ before he or she can calculate an error rate, per GAB instructions. Common human-error mistakes include addition errors and forgetting to exclude late-arriving absentee ballots (which don’t show up on the Election-night machine tape).  

This is another point at which the human hand-counters might notice that they were able to discern voter intent better than the optical scanner for some ballots, and can explain small discrepancies between the two counts by reference to several oddly marked ballots. This is no cause for alarm as long the the discrepancy between the two counts is less than one vote in every 200 or so.

If the hand-count totals need to be adjusted by more than that, there may be a problem. There may also be a problem if the auditors settle on an explanation for the discrepancy that involves a systemic issue with the machine or how it was set up. For example, if they conclude that the machine was unable to read all ballots created with an AutoMark device used by voters with disabilities, this issue should be reported regardless of how many votes it affected.

When the auditors have settled on an explanation for the discrepancy, the audit is complete. GAB instructions require them to disregard any discrepancy they can explain, and to record a calculated error rate of zero.

What to do if you see problems

If you see any practices that don’t match the instructions, ask the clerk to explain. There may be some necessary, harmless variations the clerk is doing for a sensible reason. As long as the main purpose of the test is fulfilled—verifying the accuracy of the machine-tabulated total by comparing it to the results of an objective hand count—there’s no need for observers to be sticklers.

If the clerk cannot give you a good explanation for the variation, and you think the variation prevents the audit from verifying the results’ accuracy, refer the clerk to the requirement or instruction that you believe is not being followed. Explain the reason for your concern.

If you cannot work out a mutually satisfactory resolution with the clerk, encourage him or her to contact the county clerk about the matter, and say you will do the same. Promptly write down the relevant details of the problem as you observed it, clearly, factually, and completely. Then call or email the county clerk to report the problem and ask to be kept informed as the problem is resolved.

If you believe the problem may have prevented the audit from discovering and documenting any serious miscount that might have been present, contact the Elections Division of the Wisconsin Government Accountability Board. GAB can be reached by phone at (608) 266-8005, or email at gab@wi.gov. Consider completing a complaint form (gab.wi.gov/forms/complaint ), and faxing it to GAB at (608) 267-0500.

Please also consider sending an account of the problem to the Wisconsin Grassroots Network at wisconsingrassroots@gmail.com. We will be compiling data on the problems noted by observers to improve understanding of election integrity in Wisconsin.

3. Errorless Count Requirement

a.    If an error is detected during the testing, the municipal clerk shall determine the cause and correct the error.

b.    The clerk must make an errorless count before the electronic tabulating equipment is approved by the clerk for use in the election. 

*  Indicates required or recommended features of the test deck (optical scan) or voting plan (touchscreen).

These instructions cover observing elections processes that occur before Election Day, and after the polls close. For instructions on how to observe while the polls are open, contact a group such as Wisconsin Election Protection. 

These instructions focus on observing four election processes related to counting votes. Rapid adoption of election technology after the Presidential vote-counting debacle of 2000 fixed some problems while creating others.  The most serious problem it created is that vote-counting is no longer controlled either by citizens or by our local elections officials.

Many imagined that automation would remove the risks of bias and error by removing humans from the process. But the truth is that computers don’t remove humans from the process; they only make them invisible, in the form of anonymous programmers who work for voting-machine companies, technicians who service the computers, or unauthorized hackers.  We also naively imagine that voting machines are immune to the same sorts of malfunctions we expect of every other machine in our lives—overheating, losing calibration, random glitches, whatever.

Numerous computer-security measures protect our voting machines before every election. However, citizens cannot observe any of these measures, and even our elections officials cannot observe some, such as the writing and testing of the vote-counting computer code and the manufacture of the machines themselves. For example, Wisconsin state law prohibits our voting machines from being equipped with wireless communication capability, but only the manufacturers know for sure whether communications chips were or were not installed.  

Nevertheless, we and our election officials can determine whether the security measures worked and whether our election results are correct. Processes that can help to protect accurate counting or detect miscounts are:

1. Pre-election voting-machine tests;
2. Poll-closing activities;
3. Canvass meetings; and
4. Post-election audits.

Why should citizens observe?

We often talk about transparency—the openness of governmental functions to public view and appraisal—as if it was the sole responsibility of public officials. But if citizens don’t show up to see what the public officials have to show, transparency cannot be achieved.

In addition to the obvious benefit of preventing fraud, transparency benefits both public officials and citizens. Conscientious public servants are proud to have the public see the quality of their work, because they know that doing so builds confidence in them and in election results. They know that if doubts arise about the elections process, citizen observers protect them from unfounded suspicions. All  public servants benefit from the observation in the way everyone benefits from observation and feedback: We are more careful, more thorough, and less likely to cut corners when we know someone is watching.

Observing has benefits for the observer, too. No other experience comes close to improving understanding of our elections process the way observing can—why things are done the way they are, all the unexpected oddities that can arise during even simple procedures, etc. After you observe even one elections procedure, you will be more credible and authoritative when you speak to others or advocate for changes.

Let the clerk know you’re coming and what you want to observe.

You have a right to show up unannounced at any procedure that is open to the public, but there are several benefits to calling ahead and letting the clerk know you will be there and what you want to observe.

• The clerk might have some additional information you need. For example, the county clerk may have provided the municipal clerks with some special instructions for this round of machine testing that the clerk might be willing to share with you.
• The clerk will be able to alert the workers that an observer will be present, explain your rights to them, and let them know what to expect. At many procedures citizen observers are rare, and normal human beings tend to get nervous when their work is subject to surprise inspection.
• Knowing that you will be looking to see whether the process follows prescribed instructions will give the clerk an opportunity to review those instructions before the event. If they know observers are coming, the officials will be more likely to follow the instructions, and that’s a good thing.

Prepare by reading the regulations or instructions for the activity you will be observing.

One thing Wisconsin’s Government Accountability Board (GAB) does well is make available to the public the same instructions they provide to the clerks. Links to GAB’s instructions for each of these activities are in the detailed instructions for each activity, available on the WGN website.

You don’t need to memorize the procedures, but having read through them ahead of time will enable you to:

• know what to expect;
• notice any steps that might be skipped or done in some way other than specified;
• come prepared with some questions; and
• make your questions clear and understandable, such as by using correct terminology.

Bring instructions, paper, pen, and maybe a camera.

Bring a copy of the statutes, regulations, or GAB instructions for the process with you, so that you can refer to them as the process takes place. (For references, see observers’ instructions for each process.) If you see something that you question, it will help to be able to point to the specific regulation or requirement.

Bring materials for note-taking, in case there is something you want to document or ask about later.

Taking photos or videos has pros and cons. Many municipal clerks realize it’s often in their own best interest to have someone photographing the procedures, to prove they were done correctly if they are later questioned. If something goes very wrong and you’d like to document it, having a camera or smart phone with you is a good idea.

However, taking pictures or videos also has drawbacks. Being normal humans, many elections officials are camera-shy and simply don’t like to be photographed, so weigh the benefits of taking photos or videos against the possibility of more tension and less cooperation. Although you have the right to take photos and videos in events that are open to the public, it never hurts to be considerate.

Arrive a little early.

Most election-related activities begin precisely on time, so showing up a little early is a good idea.  Arriving early allows time for cordial introductions and allows you to ask the official in charge about his or her expectations for observers’ conduct.

In particular, let the official know you might have questions during the process. Most election officials will be happy to explain anything you don’t understand, as long as answering your questions doesn’t interfere with the work. Try to clarify, before the process starts, who will be available to answer your questions and whether the official has any concerns or limitations he or she would like honored.

Arriving early also allows you to observe preparation for the event, such as the voting machines being set up and turned on for the pre-election voting machine test. When you’re observing poll-closing, it may be necessary to arrive early; if you arrive after polls close, you may be locked out.

Observe, don’t participate.

Citizens who want to participate in running elections can volunteer to be trained as poll workers or even run for the job of municipal or county clerk. Observing is a different job with a different purpose. 

To “observe” means to give impartial, careful attention to something, for the purpose of seeing, learning, and evaluating. When an observer begins to do the work or coach it, he or she loses objectivity and loses a certain amount of ability to notice things that he or she is not working directly on.  In addition, an observer who coaches the people running the process will lose the opportunity to learn how they do things when he or she is not participating.

Finally, interfering could get you thrown out. So before you observe, familiarize yourself with GAB’s simple instructions for citizen observers (gab.wi.gov/clerks/education-training/election-observers ). Notice that different rules apply for observing while the polls are open and observing at other election events. For example, photography is prohibited while polls are open, but allowed after the polls close.

Ask questions, and respect the election officials’ authority.

As an observer, you are not participating but you cannot always understand what you see unless you can ask questions and get them answered.

When you notice election officials not following the instructions, don’t immediately conclude they are making an error. Ask, while being careful to phrase your questions in an information-seeking, not a challenging, way—at least until you need to get more assertive.

Sometimes clerks have to adapt the instructions to accommodate things such as unique features of their voting equipment or some other sort of special circumstance. As long as the purpose of the process isn’t impaired, don’t be too concerned with adjustments a clerk might decide to make.

If you believe the departure from instructions violates a statute, point it out to the clerk or person in charge without contradicting his or her authority in front of people he or she is supervising, if at all possible. That will provide an opportunity for him or her to correct, rather than defend, the error.

If the error is serious and not corrected, encourage the election official in charge to report the issue to higher election officials, and let him or her know you will be doing the same. Write down what happened as soon as you can, in clear, succinct, factual detail, and report the problem to higher election officials. (See more detailed instructions at the end of observers’ instructions for each procedure.)

People have lots of ideas about how to ensure accurate election results, including throwing away the voting machines, programming them only with open-source programming, or piling on more and more pre-election security measures. Some of these ideas will help and some won't.

But without waiting for years of debate and sluggish legislative action, citizens can do five things right now under current law to make election miscounts less likely or to make sure mistakes and miscounts get caught in time to be corrected.

1. Let your local election officials know that you want voter-marked paper ballots.
2. Observe voting-machine tests before each election.
3. Observe poll-closing activities at your precinct.
4. Observe municipal and county canvass meetings
5. Encourage your local officials to perform post-election voting machine audits and observe them.

(Detailed instructions for the last four activities are here.)

1. Let your local election officials know that you want voter-marked paper ballots.

Two basic kinds of voting machines are used in Wisconsin: touch-screen voting machines on which voters record their preferences electronically on a computer; and optical scanners, into which voters insert paper ballots that they have marked by hand. Of those two systems, voter-marked paper ballots provide a much more secure and reliable record of your vote, and technology is available that enables people with disabilities to use the same kind of paper ballot as everyone else. (It's called "AutoMark.")

Touch-screen machines are less secure because the only paper record of anyone's vote is created by the machine, not by the voter. It's good that Wisconsin's touch-screen machines print a “voter-verifiable paper trail” that any voter can look at to make sure his or her vote was printed correctly--some states' machines don't. However, studies have shown that only a fraction of voters ever look at their printed paper ballot before they leave the polling place, and only a fraction who notice errors report them.

As a result, hackers know that even if they program the computer to switch a portion of their opponents' votes, so few voters will say anything to the poll workers that the switches will likely be assumed to be voter error. Mechanical problems can also prevent the trail from printing properly, rendering the election results unauditable.

County clerks and municipal clerks choose what type of voting system your polling place will use. Regardless of which system your municipality now uses, contact your county and municipal clerks at any time to let them know you prefer voting systems that allow voters to mark their own ballots--that is, systems that use paper ballots. Voting machines wear out, so whichever type of system you are using now could be replaced by the other kind. If voters do not make their preferences known, county and municipal clerks will be influenced only by the voting-machine vendors who want to sell them the more profitable touch-screen machines. Talk to your friends and family about the importance of  retaining a voter-marked paper record of every ballot, and have them contact local election officials, too.

*  *  * 

2.  Observe voting-machine tests before each election.

Every voting machine needs to be set up specifically for the unique set of races and candidates running in each election. Within 10 days before each election, your municipal clerk tests each voting machine to verify it is set up correctly. While these tests cannot predict or prevent Election-Day malfunction, they are indispensable for detecting mistakes or mis-calibrations in the way the machine was set up.

Citizen observation of the voting-machine tests provides clerks with witnesses to the quality and completeness of their testing; helps to make sure the tests are in fact done; and helps to make sure any problems are noted and corrected before Election Day. Procedures for these tests are available online in the Election Administration Manual. 

Instructions for observing these tests are here.

*  *  *

3. Observe poll-closing activities at your precinct.

Most poll-watchers depart when the polls close, or stay only to see the results printed out, leaving poll workers without citizen observation for such critical tasks as reconciling the number of ballots with the number of voters; processing write-in votes; securing the unmarked ballots; sealing ballot bags; and more.  This is the most complicated of the processes open to citizen observers, but it’s not rocket science. Read through the poll-closing instructions in the Election Day Manual; sign in before polls close with your precinct’s chief inspector, follow his or her directions, and you’ll do fine.

Even if you do not know proper poll-closing techniques as well as the poll workers performing those activities, the presence of citizen observers helps to reduce the likelihood of both fraud and error. We are not accusing election officials of anything worse than being normal humans when we point out that observers make carelessness less likely, makes problems more likely to be noticed, and makes noticed problems less likely to be swept under the rug.

Most clerks welcome citizen observers because the observers' presence protects honest, competent clerks from suspicion and can provide independent verification of the election’s integrity. 

Instructions for observing poll-closing activities are here.

*  *  *

 4.  Observe municipal and county canvass meetings

Within a few days after each election, small “Boards of Canvass” meet in each jurisdiction to review the results from all the precincts; review the records from Election Day; resolve any loose ends such as late-arriving but valid absentee votes and any challenged or provisional votes; check the totals when all the precincts’ results are added together, and make the election results final and official.

This is the municipality’s or county’s best chance to notice and correct problems in the vote-totals. Citizen observers can help to ensure that anomalies—such as a suspiciously high number of blank ballots, which might have resulted from a malfunctioning voting machine—are noticed and resolved. The presence of citizen observers can help to make sure required procedures are followed--such as examining each precinct's totals for suspiciously high proportions of  undervotes.

Instructions for observing canvass meetings are here.

*  *  *

5. Encourage your local officials to perform post-election voting machine audits and observe them.

After every election in the November of even-numbered years, after election results have been declared final, GAB randomly selects a very small number of precincts statewide and instructs those municipalities to conduct post-election voting machine audits. In addition, clerks may, if citizens request, do audits at any time after the election. Citizen observers can provide clerks with independent witnesses who can verify they performed the audits correctly; ensure the chain of custody of the ballots was adequately protected; and make sure any oddities that are noticed are not dismissed without being recorded and resolved.

A voting-machine audit done at GAB's direction must consist of a hand count of all the votes in several races selected by the GAB, and comparison of the hand-count total to the machine-tabulated total. Although these audits have several serious limitations, which we documented in our 2013 report, they provide local election officials and citizens a valuable opportunity to assess how well the machines operated.

Audits performed at the initiative of local election officials or citizens can use more efficient methods of verifying the machines' results, some of which are referenced in the same report. Encourage your local election officials to adopt a practice of routinely auditing at least some randomly selected voting machines after every election. With routine practice, the audit process will become more efficient, and with publicity, even a small amount of random auditing will have a big deterrent effect on fraud and carelessness. 

Instructions for observing voting-machine audits are here.

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For updates, follow Wisconsin Election Integrity on Facebook.

I’ve told the story of the 2004 Medford, Wisconsin election miscount often enough that I figured it was time to call the people involved and get some first-hand details. Fortunately, the principals are still on the job: Bruce Strama is still Taylor County Clerk, despite having had to deal with what must be a clerk’s nightmare: telling more than 600 of his most partisan constituents he hadn’t counted their votes. The vendor had misprogrammed Medford’s voting machines to ignore straight-party-ticket votes on the November 2004 ballot, which included a presidential election. Strama didn't discover the problem, though. We can credit Mark Grebner for that, who is still with the political consulting firm that first noticed the anomaly while using Taylor County's election records to compile voter lists.

You Are The Boss - Manage Your Employees

First of all, find your legislators! Check out this link-click on the word WISCONSIN and you will be taken to the state legislature website to locate your state senator and representative. Be prepared with your ZIP+4 code because this page also has a link to the U.S. House of Representatives page to locate your US Representative!

Start with My Vote Wisconsin - your guide to the local election scene, presented by the Government Accountability Board (GAB).

For real political mainliners, try the GAB website itself! It is full of lots of good stuff. UNFORTUNATELY, the state legislature has replaced it with two BI-PARTISAN boards (ELECTIONS and ETHICS as of 2016).

If you want to keep track of what your federal legislators are doing, there is always GovTrack.us who lets us know how our selected legislators (ours or those we just want to keep an eye on) are voting. 

If you really want to keep an eye on your legislators, WisconsinEye.org does a great job on the state level and C-span is available on the web as well as on cable to keep an eye on Washington.

To find out who is buying your legislators' ears, check out http://www.wisdc.org/wdc.php for STATE legislators and the federal equivalent site is http://www.opensecrets.org/.

If you come across local links of interest, please let us know. Most county board meetings are available online (usually delayed but sometimes live).

Comments are always welcome as are links to other sites.

Just a reminder - YOU are the BIGGEST part of the solution!

Find out WHERE you can vote (or REGISTER) at this link: https://myvote.wi.gov/Address/AddressSearchScreen.aspx!